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Abstract
Connecting Australian health services and the e-health initiative is a major talking point currently. Many issues 
are presented as key to its success including solving issues with confidentiality and privacy. However the largest 
problem may not be these issues in sharing information but the fact that the point of origin and storage of such 
records is still relatively insecure.  Australia aims to have a Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record in 
2012 and this is underpinned by a national network for e-health. It is this very foundation that becomes the 
critical infrastructure, with general practice the cornerstone for its success. Yet, research into the security of 
medical information has shown that many general practices are unable to create an environment with effective 
information security. This paper puts together the connections of e-health and the complex environment in which 
it is positioned. A discussion of how this critical infrastructure is assembled is presented, and the key 
vulnerabilities are identified. Further, it addresses how security may be approached to cater for this diverse and 
complex environment. From a national security and critical infrastructure perspective, as medical records are 
part of society’s critical infrastructure, the most effective system attacks are those on the points of highest 
vulnerability. In our current health system infrastructure those points are the data collection and records 
retention areas of individual medical providers. Progress towards changing this situation is key to its success. 
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INTRODUCTION
In May 2010 the Australian Federal Government announced it will spend $466.7 million over two years to 
create a secure e-health record for every desiring Australian. This is a core function of the e-health initiative 
currently underway in Australia. The objective of e-health is to improve patient care through the use of 
information technology and electronic communication by connecting individuals and communities across 
various healthcare service providers (World Health Organisation, 2009). “E-Health should be viewed as both the 
essential infrastructure underpinning information exchange between all participants in the Australian healthcare 
system and as a key enabler and driver of improved health outcomes for all Australians” (Deloitte, 2008).  
A fundamental aspect of the e-health record is the assignment of individual healthcare identifiers, consisting of 
16 digits, to every Australian. This has necessitated associated new federal legislation. Furthermore, to enable 
the creation of an e-health infrastructure there are many supporting services being established on a national 
basis. At present many of these will be managed centrally such as the Healthcare Identifiers Service and the 
National Authentication Service for Health (NASH). This initiative draws attention to another fundamental issue 
that has been the subject of much debate in e-health, that of privacy and confidentiality. Given the fragmented 
nature of the development of privacy policy across Australia although underpinned by the National Privacy Act 
1988, this has meant a review of legislation at a federal, state and territory level,. Driven by the evolution of the 
networked environment since 1988 to 2011, and the e-health initiative, this Act is undergoing major review to 
among other things bring together the incongruent state and territory privacy legislation. In addition, there has 
been considerable concern over the actual transmission of health information and its security, in the e-health 
environment this is referred to as secure messaging. However, in the Australian context the term has taken on a 
broader meaning than simply protection of the content, it also includes the delivery and identification of the 
correct healthcare destination and patient identification. This has made this area of development of e-health 
system more problematic to incorporate unique identification, authorisation and message security in one 
message.  
Whilst these are important aspects of the construction of an effective and safe e-health system, the elemental 
security of a national system needs serious consideration.  Consistent with the “systems” approach to security 
this is a significant undertaking requiring that all components of such a system be individually secure whilst also 
ensuring consistent and compatible security between components, in order that the resulting infrastructure is 
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also secure. Complete oversight and security control of such a system is impossible in the Australian context 
given the nature of Australia’s health system. In countries with smaller populations, smaller geographical area 
and government controlled health services this is more achievable. However, in Australia the mixture of private 
and public health providers and services results in less overall control and the responsibility for security 
devolved to individual healthcare provider organisations. Primary care, which includes general practitioners is 
the cornerstone to Australia healthcare system. As most primary care providers operate as small businesses this 
poses additional concerns in regard to implementing effective information security measures including internal 
expertise, a culture of trust and financial constraints.  Indeed, research has shown that this section of the health 
system is particularly subject to these concerns (Williams, 2010; 2008). 
AUSTRALIA’S HEALTH SYSTEM 
Australian e-health aims to transform individual paper-based systems into a cohesive and effective electronic 
system within ten years (AHMAC, 2008). This has resulted in a shared healthcare model that includes a 
Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record (PCEHR). This requires a  “nationally consistent system for 
identifying individuals, providers and organisations” to “support the implementation of a security and access 
framework to ensure the appropriate authorisation and authentication of healthcare providers who legitimately 
access national e-health infrastructure, including the HI Service within the Australian healthcare system” and 
“support secure messaging from one healthcare provider to another by providing a consistent identifier that can 
be used in e-communication” (Australian Health Ministers’ Conference, 2009).  
The justification for such a system is demonstrated in terms of the economic benefit from increased productivity 
and reduced clinical adverse events. Using an e-health model, this is estimated to be between $6.7 billion and 
$7.9 billion over 10 years (The Allen Consulting Group, 2008). Further, in terms of patient care, it has been 
estimated that around 10% of hospital admissions are due to adverse drug events and around 18% of medical 
errors are due to the inadequate availability of patient information (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 
2008). Currently $660 million per year in hospital admissions are linked to medication errors resulting from 
poor availability of patient information (Crozier, 2010).  
Attempting to connect all healthcare services and providers is a colossal task. The diversity of provider 
organisations and their existing individual information systems ensures a resultant complex infrastructure.   In a 
predominantly paper-based system, the infrastructure and information is organisationally based and the 
management of these resides within the remit of each healthcare organisation. In shifting this to a primarily 
electronic environment, the design of the entire system becomes more complex. This is due in part to the 
demands of, and need for, additional identification and authentication. In the physical environment, for instance 
where a patient is in possession of a written referral letter, normal personal identification suffices. Whereas, in 
the design of an e-health system (in very cursory terms) must include multiple information source nodes (e.g. a 
primary care provider), health information exchanges, health information repositories, together with indexing 
services, security services, and web based portals for healthcare providers and consumers.   
HEALTHCARE AS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
Healthcare services are a critical infrastructure sector for Australia (Australian Government, 2010). Interruption 
to critical infrastructure and the services it delivers or supports, where this is defined by its impact on the 
societal or economic well-being or its affect on national security, is a serious concern for government. Within 
the health architecture this includes hospitals, public health communications and transport, and research 
laboratories and will be extended to the increasing connectedness of Australia’s e-health system. Thus 
Australians will increasingly rely on an interdependent health system for which the impact of potential cyber 
attacks cannot be underestimated.  
Dependency of health on critical infrastructure  
A common question is posed about why the health system and particularly an e-health system is critical 
infrastructure when healthcare is about treating patients. Indeed, from an individual patient perspective, a 
clinician can still treat a patient in the absence of information about the patient.   However, the e-health critical 
infrastructure it is not about patient care but the structures and information that support patient care and the 
system of healthcare provision this provides for the community as a whole.  
In addition, new avenues for healthcare delivery are being adopted. Globally there exists considerable interest in 
the use of technology for remote patient-doctor consultations (Daimi & Song, 2010). The inclusion of unique 
technically based services such as telemedicine using the Internet or similar capacity communications is an 
attractive proposition for healthcare delivery in Australia. Expansion of normal healthcare services and reliance 
on the transfer of information, has led to the use of telehealth as part of healthcare services. This is rapidly being 
recognised as an essential service for Australia. Indeed, in July 2011, Medicare (the national health funding 
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body) has incentivised the use of telehealth consultations with both one off set up and ongoing use payments 
(Medicare, 2011).  The real-time security of individual consultations is not an insurmountable problem and 
several professional medical organisations are producing protocols and guidelines to support its implementation. 
The security of the consultation will not be an issue, however the increasing utilisation and reliance on these 
services will be. A major infrastructure or end-user cyber incident would render these services non-operational.  
Multiple points of vulnerability 
The integration of individual systems creates greater system susceptibilities. Such susceptibilities increase with 
poor intelligence communication ability.  Whilst the focus is still on creating the national system and its 
connection, and whilst security is an integral concern, the methods to share and collate information on security 
breaches and attacks do not appear on the agenda. However, there has been a substantial increase of security 
breaches in the medical industry (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2010) and there is plenty of evidence regarding 
security breaches. Small organisations, which will make up over half of the connections to the national e-health 
system , are particularly susceptible. Statistics suggest that 83% of small organizations (with less than fifty staff) 
had an average of 14 and 45 breaches and this rose to 92% of large organisations in 2009. The categorization of 
the breaches indicates that malware and attempts at network intrusions were the major sources of breaches, with 
approximately 60% of organisations reporting their occurrence (Infosecurity Europe, 2010). As yet, there is no 
mandatory reporting of security breaches as no legislative notification laws exist in Australia resulting in a dark 
figure of security events.  
Another issue in the protection of information in the healthcare infrastructure is that health data travels across 
domains, whereas in areas such as banking it resides within a single domain (Reid, 2010). This creates 
vulnerability in the semantic interpretation and interoperability of information exchange. Indeed, one reason that 
Australia’s e-health system has been so long in development is because of this interoperability issue.  
MORE PROBLEMS THAN SOLUTIONS? 
Significant progress has been made in the construction of Australia’s e-health system and in the recognition of 
the security issues it faces. Driven by the commitment to a personally controlled electronic health record by the 
government, the services which will underpin this including the health identifiers service and the national 
authentication service for health (NASH) which is used for verifying the authenticity of both patients and 
healthcare providers and organisations, will become the cornerstone of the interdependent e-health system. 
Incapacitation of any of these services will halt the transfer of information in the currently proposed structural e-
health model. It should be borne in mind that the final structure of the whole system is still a work in progress.  
The rapid adoption of newer technologies and large volumes of patient data makes it a challenge for institutions 
to maintain security and will pose a major challenge for Australia to progress towards the national e-health 
interoperability. Unfortunately, whilst larger organizations in the health system may have IT or security trained 
personnel, primary health care providers in Australia do not. Thus the security function falls to staff which 
creates considerable exposure of the organization to potential security breaches. The Australian Government 
(2010) report on critical infrastructure resiliency clearly states that coordination and planning are a necessity. At 
the same time it acknowledges that the private sector owns and controls the majority of the infrastructure. This 
means that in an environment where independence is promoted, the major concern is national coordination of 
recovery from a major incident. In our current health system infrastructure those points are the data collection 
and records retention areas of individual medical providers and progress towards supporting and educating 
security to these areas are key to its success in protection and system resilience.  
At a more granular level, a key point of the e-heath system is at the local computer system where the raw data is 
collected and usually stored. Indeed, the current status of information security for all the separate parts of the 
healthcare services and organisations, particularly the frontline healthcare providers such as primary care 
medical practices, must be compared to the needs of information security in a broader national e-health system. 
The potential issues that hamper recovery of a national system are central control and oversight on the 
conceptual level, as well as the poor understanding of security at the end-user level. At the end points this means 
that individually, recovery would be reliant on the self-sufficiency of each medical practice. However, the 
ability of these practices to individually and collectively recover is questionable. For the primary care and the 
specialist sector of healthcare, in fact any healthcare provider organization of small to medium size will have 
challenges in resourcing security. These include a lack of time, a lack of funding, and a lack of understanding of 
the potential dangers and appropriate responses to these dangers. In addition, the ability to put in place effective 
security measures in health care is also affected by an overarching culture of trust and the heightened 
responsibility of ethical considerations relating to privacy and confidentiality (Williams, 2008).  
At present primary care is not being encouraged to take a larger view of their individual contribution to a 
national e-health system and what responsibility this entails. For these providers the aspects of business 
continuity and disaster recovery requires more emphasis. The view of recovery needs to be broader and more 
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emphatic. To this end the National E-health Transition Authority (NEHTA) has put considerable effort into 
developing a security and access framework (NESAF). This framework is designed to work across the different 
domains of healthcare and across the multiple services that are being developed to support the e-health 
structures. In the past year the review and emphasis on the security of this aspect has been given more 
credibility and recognised as a fundamental aspect of the total e-health project.  
CONCLUSION 
The national e-health initiative is an important and positive move forward for Australia and the healthcare 
benefits it can provide. Healthcare service provision and effective management of information is complex which 
demands a complex solution. Until Australia’s e-health system is fully operational, the realisation of both the 
benefits and the vulnerabilities may not be apparent. However, what is known is that the vulnerability of this 
national asset is based on the multiplicity of services required, the mix of public and private healthcare 
providers, the complexity of connections, the level of knowledge and skills in IT and security, and the difficulty 
in perceiving a comprehensive national system vision.  As yet, an overall approach to Australian e-health system 
in terms of security and resilience has not been clearly defined, particularly in terms of responsibility. 
Each individual healthcare provider and organisation system as well as the local, regional and national physical 
and information services together makes up the national e-health infrastructure.  Ultimately Australia’s e-health 
system resilience and sustainability in face of its vulnerabilities will be the ability of this infrastructure to 
continue to function correctly, even with diminished performance. This could be achievable if it incorporates a 
level of adaptability including redundancy, by the individual components that comprise the entire infrastructure.  
Given this diverse, multifaceted, dynamic structure and its complex interactions, together with the non-static 
nature of threats and vulnerability, what will be required is an overall ‘systems’ approach to managing the risks, 
vulnerabilities, controls and recovery.  
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